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What is the relation between novelty, creativity, and innovation, on the one hand, and the 
phenomenon of seeing-as, on the other?  And what if anything does Wittgenstein’s work on 
seeing an aspect teach us about that relation?   
It is common to say that someone who acquires a new set of concepts or a new system 
of belief comes to see things in a new way.  In that vein, Thomas Kuhn famously likens 
paradigm shifts in science to Gestalt shifts in perception.1  The shift from a geocentric to a 
heliocentric cosmology, he thinks, or from Newtonian physics to Einsteinian physics, is like 
the shift from seeing the duck aspect of the duck-rabbit figure to seeing its rabbit aspect: 
when we shift from one paradigm to another, we come to see the world in a new way – as 
containing things and properties that we did not see before.  Similarly, religious conversion is 
often described as involving a transformation in the convert’s way of seeing the world.  In 
one sense, everything remains as it was before; but in another sense, everything is seen 
differently.  Or again, the development of the concept of sexual harassment is said to have 
changed people’s way of seeing things; a remark that would formerly have been seen as a 
joke, for instance, came to be seen as an instance of harassment.  In these and other cases it is 
extremely natural to describe the acquisition of new concepts, or a new theory, or new 
knowledge, as involving coming to experience the world in a new way.  But how seriously 
should we take that idea and what should we make of it? 
I shall consider three issues.  First, is there any special connection between seeing-as 
and novelty: a connection that is absent from the case of grasping familiar concepts, theories 
or knowledge?  Second, is there an explanatory relation between seeing-as and novelty?  Is 
conceptual or theoretical innovation explained by the fact that the innovator sees things in a 
new way?  Third, whatever association there is between seeing-as and novelty, is it 
important?  Why, if at all, does it matter that someone who grasps new concepts experiences 
things in a new way?  Would she be any worse off if she simply operated with the new 
concepts in a way that left her experience of the world unaffected?  
Before proceeding, I note a preliminary point about the notion of novelty.  We can 
distinguish between two kinds of case in which someone acquires a new theory or set of 
concepts.  On the one hand, there is the case of genuine theoretical or conceptual innovation: 
the case where a person devises a theory or set of concepts that no-one has grasped before.  
On the other hand, there is the case where she acquires an existing theory or set of concepts: 
the theory she acquires is new to her; but it is already understood by others.  That is an 
important distinction; it is more difficult, and requires more creative effort, to formulate an 
original theory than to learn an existing theory from other people.  But with respect to the 
links between seeing-as and novelty, the distinction seems less important.  In both cases, I 
move from not understanding to understanding; in both cases, the theory that I come to grasp 
is new for me; in both cases, I come to see phenomena, or patterns, or connections that I did 
not see before.  In exploring the connections between seeing-as and novelty, therefore, I shall 
generally use the notion of novelty in an inclusive sense: for the purposes of this discussion, 
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theories or concepts are novel if they are new for the person grasping them, even if they are 
not novel from the perspective of humanity as a whole.2  
 
 
2. Is there a special connection between seeing-as and novelty?  
Is there a special connection between seeing-as and novelty; a connection that is absent from 
situations where someone applies familiar concepts in straightforward and familiar cases?  
The following argument might suggest that there is no special connection.  Suppose we 
accept that coming to grasp a new theory or set of concepts involves coming to see things in a 
new way.  If conceptual innovation involves seeing things in a new way, there must have 
been some way in which the innovator saw things before: an old way of seeing, associated 
with the old system of concepts, just as the new way of seeing things is associated with the 
new system of concepts.  So, if there is a connection between seeing-as and novelty, it is hard 
to avoid the conclusion that grasping any set of concepts involves seeing-as: seeing things in 
some particular way.  According to this argument, there is a quite general connection between 
the concepts one grasps and the way one sees the world: the connection between grasping 
new concepts and seeing things in a new way is simply a product of that more general 
connection.3 
There is some plausibility in that argument.  But Wittgenstein’s discussion of seeing 
an aspect suggests a more nuanced position.  On this more nuanced position, there is indeed a 
general connection between seeing-as and grasping concepts.  But there are also links 
between seeing-as and novelty that go beyond that general connection.  We can work up to 
that position by considering some details of Wittgenstein’s discussion. 
Does Wittgenstein think there is a special connection between seeing aspects and 
novelty?  Or does he think that seeing-as is a perfectly general phenomenon?  On the one 
hand, he draws particular attention to a range of phenomena that specifically involve novelty 
or change: noticing an aspect, experiencing a change of aspects, an aspect’s dawning or 
lighting up.4  On the other hand, he talks about the ‘continuous seeing’ of an aspect, which 
seems independent of any change or novelty (see PPF §118).  What, in his view, is the 
connection between these two kinds of phenomena?  On one interpretation, Wittgenstein 
takes continuous aspect-perception as the basic case; the cases involving novelty and change 
(noticing an aspect, experiencing a change of aspects etc.) are merely upshots or 
manifestations of that basic phenomenon.5  On a different interpretation, change and novelty 
are basic to Wittgenstein’s conception of seeing-as: those are the phenomena he is really 
interested in and, in his view, the phenomenon of continuous aspect perception occurs only in 
the context of some possible change.6  Which interpretation best captures Wittgenstein’s 
discussion?  
Before addressing that question, we should register a note of caution.  It would be a 
mistake to try to organize the whole range of phenomena that Wittgenstein discusses as 
instances of seeing an aspect in terms of a single distinction between the continuous seeing of 
an aspect, on the one hand, and noticing an aspect, or experiencing a change of aspects, or an 
aspect’s lighting up, on the other hand.  It would be similarly mistaken to press the question, 
‘Exactly what does Wittgenstein take seeing-as to involve?’  In his view, seeing-as is not a 
single, homogeneous phenomenon.  Part of his point is that ‘there is an enormous number of 
interrelated phenomena and possible concepts’ in this area (PPF §155).  He notes that the 
concept of what is seen is ‘very elastic’ (PPF §147).  And he insists that ‘there is not one 
genuine, proper case’ of describing what is seen (PPF §160).  Thus, if we apply what 
Wittgenstein says to the case where someone sees, say, a portrait of Elizabeth I, we can 
distinguish at least four senses or levels of seeing that may be involved.  First, the person may 
see the picture without being conscious of its qualities at all.7  Second, he may see it, and be 
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aware of the colours and shapes it contains, without seeing it as a picture of Elizabeth I.  And, 
as Wittgenstein says, that is consistent with his knowing that it is a picture of Elizabeth I and 
being able to work out various things about her from the picture.  Third, he may see it as a 
picture of Elizabeth I: he sees her in the picture; and, in Wittgenstein’s phrase, he views the 
picture as the person it represents (PPF §197).  Fourth, he suggests, there is a further concept 
of seeing-as: 
[the concept] of a seeing-as which occurs only while I am actually concerning myself 
with the picture as the object represented. 
I could say: a picture is not always alive for me while I am seeing it. 
‘Her picture smiles down on me from the wall.’  It need not always do so, 
whenever my glance lights on it (PPF §§199-200). 
What all that suggests is something that we would anyway expect on general grounds.  
Wittgenstein’s discussion explores a large number of related but different perceptual 
phenomena.  He does not aim to explain or analyse the phenomena in terms of anything more 
basic.  (So, for instance, he rejects the assumption that the various phenomena of seeing-as 
can be explained in terms of a bipartite distinction between experience on the one hand and 
thought on the other.8)  Nor does he hope to formulate a general theory about seeing-as.  On 
the contrary, he explicitly eschews such ambitions: 
(In giving all these examples, I am not aiming at some kind of completeness.  Not a 
classification of psychological concepts.  They are only meant to enable the reader to 
cope with conceptual unclarities.) (PPF §202) 
In the light of that, we should be cautious about the idea that Wittgenstein thinks of one kind 
of phenomenon (continuous seeing of an aspect, say, or noticing an aspect) as the basic case, 
or that his main interest is focused on one class of cases rather than another. 
 That point is well taken.  But, having acknowledged it, we can still consider our 
question about Wittgenstein’s attitude to the relation between seeing-as and novelty.  As we 
have noted, he is happy to talk about the continuous seeing of an aspect.  And he is happy to 
say that someone who only ever sees the duck-rabbit picture as a picture-rabbit is a case of 
seeing-as: he sees the figure as a picture-rabbit (PPF §121).  In such a case, seeing-as seems 
to have no essential connection with novelty: with noticing an aspect, experiencing a change 
of aspect, or an aspect’s lighting up.  And visual experience seems quite generally to involve 
seeing-as in this sense: I see the object on my desk as a mug (rather than merely knowing that 
it is a mug); I see the mouthpiece of my French Horn as a mouthpiece (and do not have to 
work out that it is a mouthpiece); I see the thing in the shop window as a bicycle; and so on.   
However, someone who thinks that the real focus of Wittgenstein’s interest is this 
inclusive notion of seeing-as must explain why he gives so much attention to the more 
limited and specific phenomena of novelty and change of aspect.  At least two explanations 
might be suggested.  One suggestion is that the reason why Wittgenstein emphasizes 
examples of aspect-change and so forth is simply that they are particularly good cases for 
establishing a point he wants to make about visual experience in general.  The general point, 
on this view, is that perception is theory-laden: our awareness of the world does not present 
us with a mere mosaic of shapes and colours, which we have to interpret as experience of 
objects and properties around us; on the contrary, the objects and properties are built into the 
intrinsic nature of the experience.  The phenomenon of aspect-change is then said to provide 
compelling support for this general point.  For, it is said, it is simply obvious that aspect-
change is an experiential phenomenon and not a merely cognitive one; the idea that our 
experience remains the same throughout, and that what changes is just the interpretation we 
put on it, obviously falsifies the phenomenology.  But once that point is appreciated for the 
special case of aspect-change, the more general point can be seen to apply to all visual 
experience. 
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A second putative explanation for Wittgenstein’s focus on cases where aspects change 
or light up starts from Wittgenstein’s insistence that it is only appropriate to say ‘S sees x as 
an F’ (or even, that the utterance only makes sense) if there is some contrast or ambiguity in 
question.  In a straightforward case where I recognize a familiar object – a cup, say – for what 
it is, and have no thought of its being anything else, it would, he thinks, be inappropriate (or 
even senseless) for me to say ‘I see the cup as a cup’; that utterance ‘would not be 
understood’ (PPF §122).  Similarly, if I see the duck-rabbit figure and have no idea that it is 
an ambiguous figure, it would be inappropriate for me to say ‘I see it as a picture-rabbit’; I 
should simply say ‘I see a picture-rabbit’.  That makes it natural for Wittgenstein’s discussion 
of seeing-as to focus on instances of aspect shift or aspect dawning, where – in the nature of 
the case – there is always a relevant contrast, which guarantees that talk of seeing-as will 
always be appropriate.  But, on the current suggestion, it is compatible with that to hold that 
Wittgenstein takes the phenomenon of seeing-as to be a ubiquitous one.  For even if I am not 
aware of the ambiguity, so cannot appropriately say, ‘I’m seeing the figure as a picture-
rabbit’, it is still true that I do see it as a picture-rabbit; and others who are aware of the 
ambiguity can appropriately say of me, ‘He is seeing it as a picture-rabbit’ (PPF §121).  So, 
on this view, Wittgenstein means to be discussing a quite general phenomenon; but there is a 
good reason why his discussion of seeing-as tends nonetheless to focus on the narrower 
category of cases where aspects change or light up. 
What should we make of these arguments?  Wittgenstein certainly does employ a 
notion of seeing-as that is intended to apply very generally – including in cases where there is 
no kind of novelty in play.  But it would be wrong to conclude that the reasons for his 
particular focus on cases of novelty are exhausted by the considerations we have just 
sketched.  For, as he presents things, the character of the experiences involved in cases where 
aspects change or light up goes beyond anything that is intelligible in terms of the more 
general phenomenon.  In a shift of aspects (say, the shift from seeing the rabbit-aspect of the 
duck-rabbit picture to seeing the duck-aspect), there is not just a change in our experience: a 
change from seeing things one way to seeing them another way.  There is also an experience 
of change: an experience of something changing (or seeming to change).  And that experience 
of change itself has a distinctive character: the person who experiences a change of aspects is 
aware of things changing in one respect but being unchanged in another.  As Wittgenstein 
puts it: 
I observe a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another.  I see that it has not 
changed; and yet I see it differently (PPF §113). 
Or again: 
The expression of a change of aspect is the expression of a new perception and, at the 
same time, an expression of an unchanged perception (PPF §130) 
That feature of a change in aspects is plainly not present in the general case of seeing-as.  Nor 
is it explicable in terms of anything that is. 
Parallel remarks apply in the case of the dawning of an aspect.  Consider the case 
where I am suddenly struck by the likeness between someone and his father (PPF §111-13, 
§§239ff).  When I am struck by the resemblance, there is a change in my experience.  But the 
change is not just a shift from one way of seeing things to another.  Being struck by a likeness 
– like being aware of a change – is itself an experience. And it is an essentially transitory 
experience; it is not something that could be a permanent feature of my awareness of 
anything.  As Wittgenstein puts it: ‘The likeness strikes me, and its striking me fades’ (PPF 
§244); ‘There is a physiognomy in the aspect, which then fades away’ (PPF §238).  So in this 
case, as with the case of aspects changing, there is something present in the novelty-involving 
case that is not a feature of the general case of seeing an aspect and cannot be accounted for 
in terms of that general case. Wittgenstein is certainly interested in a general phenomenon of 
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seeing-as.  But his discussion of the novelty-involving cases highlights features that go 
beyond the more general phenomenon. 
A further issue is suggested by Wittgenstein’s discussion of aspect-blindness.  As we 
have just seen, the general phenomenon of continuous aspect-perception is distinct from the 
particular phenomena of aspect-change and aspect-dawning in this sense: the particular 
phenomena cannot be accounted for in terms of the more general phenomenon.  But is the 
general phenomenon distinct in a further sense: can the general ability to see something as 
something exist without the ability to have experiences of aspect-shift, aspect-dawning, and 
so forth?   
Empirical evidence suggests that it can: that there is a stage in human development at 
which children do have continuous seeing-as without the ability to see changes in aspect.9  
For instance, they react to pictures as we do: they see the rabbit aspect of a picture-rabbit, and 
do not merely interpret the picture as a representation of a rabbit.  And, with an ambiguous 
picture, they can see it in one way in one context and in a different way in a different context: 
they see the duck-rabbit picture as a picture-rabbit when it is surrounded by other pictures of 
rabbits, and as a picture-duck when surrounded by other pictures of ducks.  But they cannot 
see the ambiguous picture shift from one aspect to the other; nor, while seeing something as a 
picture-rabbit, can they try to see it as something else, or acknowledge that it could be 
something else.  If that is the right way of understanding the data, then the ability to see a 
picture shift from one aspect to another is indeed a separate ability in the further sense 
defined above: someone can have the ability to see aspects without being able to experience 
shifts of aspect.10 
Where does Wittgenstein stand on this question?  The evidence is equivocal.  In a 
remark originating in notebooks from February 1948, he writes: ‘Of course it is imaginable 
that someone might never see a change of aspect, the three-dimensional aspect of every 
picture always remaining constant for him.  But this assumption doesn’t interest us’ (RPP II 
§480).  The first sentence of that remark might suggest that Wittgenstein agrees that someone 
can see a schematic cube as a three-dimensional cube, say, without being able to experience a 
shift from one aspect to the other.  But the second sentence cancels that suggestion.  Someone 
may, as a matter of empirical fact, never see a change of aspect.  Nonetheless, Wittgenstein 
seems to suggest, that empirical possibility is consistent with there being a necessary 
connection between the ability to see the schematic cube as a cube and the ability to see 
aspects change, even if that latter ability is never in fact triggered.   
A remark from the slightly later discussion in ‘Philosophy of Psychology: A 
Fragment’, however, might suggest a different view.  Here Wittgenstein is discussing the 
double cross figure, which can be seen as a white cross on a black ground and as a black 
cross on a white ground; he calls these ‘the A aspects’ (see PPF §212).  He writes: 
The aspect-blind man is supposed not to see the A aspects change.  But is he also 
supposed not to recognize that the double cross contains both a black and a white 
cross?  So if told ‘Show me figures containing a black cross among these examples’, 
will he be unable to manage it?  No.  He is supposed to be able to do that, but not to 
say: ‘Now it’s a black cross on a white ground!’ (PPF §257). 
It is explicit here that the aspect-blind person cannot see the change of aspect.  But can he see 
the double-cross figure as a black cross on a white ground and, separately, as a white cross on 
a black ground?  That depends on how we understand Wittgenstein’s use of ‘recognize’11.  If 
‘recognizing’ that the figure contains a black cross involves seeing it that way (rather than 
merely knowing, or working out, that it contains a black cross), then this will be a case where 
Wittgenstein allows that a person can see something as something without being able to see 
the relevant aspects changing.  But if ‘recognizing’ that the figure contains a black cross is 
consistent with not seeing it that way, then Wittgenstein’s example provides no evidence for 
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his acceptance of that possibility.  I shall not try to resolve here the question of exactly what 
patterns of deficits Wittgenstein takes to be intelligible in this area.  As I have said, the 
evidence about his view seems equivocal.  That is perhaps unsurprising, since Wittgenstein’s 
discussion of aspect-blindness is deliberately open-ended and exploratory.  He is not setting 
out to describe an actual phenomenon with which we are all familiar.  Rather, he uses the 
imagined phenomenon of aspect-blindness as a way of probing the familiar phenomenon of 
seeing aspects.  As he puts it: ‘I form a concept and ask myself how one might follow 
through with it consistently.  What we feel would deserve to be called that’ (RPP II 491). 
 It is time to take stock.  We started this section with the question, whether there is a 
special connection between seeing-as and novelty, or whether the relation between seeing 
things in a new way and grasping new concepts or theories is simply a manifestation of a 
more general phenomenon of seeing-as.  The lessons we have drawn from Wittgenstein’s 
discussion of seeing aspects cast light on that original question.  Suppose we accept that 
grasping new concepts or theories involves coming to see things in a new way.  That is in 
part a manifestation of a more general phenomenon: grasping any system of concepts, new or 
old, involves seeing things in a certain way.  But there is something special about cases of 
novelty that goes beyond that general phenomenon.  When I come to accept a new theory I 
shift from an old way of seeing things to a new way.  But in some cases, at least, there is not 
merely a change in the way I experience things. There is also an experience of change: an 
awareness of a change in the way I am understanding or conceptualizing things.  There may 
also be a sense of things that had previously been puzzling suddenly making sense.  And so 
on.  Such experiences are part of the phenomenon of conceptual or theoretical novelty.  They 
go beyond a mere shift from an old way of seeing things to a new way.  And they have no 
analogue in the general case of applying familiar concepts.  To that extent, then, there really 
is something special about the specific connection between seeing-as and coming to grasp 
new concepts or theories. 
Even if we accept that point, however, we may still wonder about the significance of 
the connection.  Is the special connection between seeing-as and conceptual or theoretical 
novelty simply a matter of doing descriptive justice to the facts about our experience?  Or 
does seeing-as in some way help to explain conceptual innovation? 
 
 
3. Does seeing-as explain innovation? 
It may be tempting to think that seeing-as can help to explain creativity or innovation.  It is 
her ability to see things in new or unorthodox ways, we may think, that explains the 
innovator’s success in discovering or devising new theories.  Relatedly, it can be tempting to 
think that seeing-as helps to explain our grasp of new concepts.  Indeed, it might be argued 
that the only way of explaining how someone can come to grasp a completely new system of 
concepts is in terms of the idea that she comes to see things in a new way.  For, the thought 
would go, if the concepts she acquires really are new ones, then she cannot come to 
understand them by grasping a definition or explanation formulated in terms of concepts she 
already understands; what makes the new concepts new ones is precisely that they cannot be 
captured in that way.  But there must be some way in which she comes to grasp these new 
concepts and categories.  And the idea that the learner comes to see things in a new way 
seems to fit the bill: it recognizes that the new concepts cannot be captured in terms of the old 
ones; but, on the current view, it avoids leaving our ability to acquire new concepts as a 
complete mystery.  A version of the same idea is expressed in the appealing thought that a 
person’s grasp of a rule ultimately depends simply on her seeing things in the right way.  As 
Wittgenstein says, there must be ‘a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation’ (PI 
§201).  And, on the current proposal, what someone has when she grasps a rule without an 
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interpretation is a kind of perceptual capacity: she sees this, this, and this as correct 
applications of the rule at the relevant points. 
 I said that it may be tempting to think that we can appeal to seeing-as to explain 
theoretical innovation or the acquisition of new concepts.  If we follow Wittgenstein, 
however, it is a temptation we should resist.  He himself shows no inclination at all to appeal 
to seeing-as to give such explanations.  And, as we shall see, though his discussion leaves 
room for seeing-as to figure in a certain kind of explanation, of limited scope, it does not 
leave room for the kind of explanation that it might be tempting to envisage. 
Wittgenstein asks: ‘How can a language-game suddenly become clear to a child?’ 
(LW I 873).  The particular case he is considering is the ‘language-game’ of ascribing pain to 
people; a language-game that acknowledges the possibility of pretence, and includes 
expressions of both belief and doubt.  In learning this practice, Wittgenstein says, one ‘learns 
the use of the expression “to be in pain” in all its persons, tenses, and numbers, but also in 
connection with negation and the verbs of opinion’ (LW I 874).  How does a child come to 
grasp that practice? 
Today for the first time he said ‘I believe she’s in pain’.  But that’s not enough.  So I 
must assume that in what followed he showed the he hadn’t simply repeated 
somebody’s words.  In short, that his utterance was the beginning of a game, and that 
he was able to continue with it.  Today, so it seemed, the game had become clear to 
him (LW I 874). 
Then comes the question quoted above: how can the language-game suddenly become clear 
to the child?  Wittgenstein responds: 
God only knows – One day it starts doing something.  An analogue might be the child 
learning a board game which he sees played daily (LW I 873). 
Wittgenstein does not say that the reason why the practice suddenly becomes clear to the 
child is that he suddenly sees things in the right way.  On the contrary, there is in his view no 
informative answer to the question, how the practice suddenly becomes clear: at least, there is 
no informative answer at the level of personal-level, common-sense psychology, which is, for 
him, the level at which philosophy operates.  The fact is that the practice does suddenly 
become clear to the child: at one point, he has not grasped it; at another point, he has.  That 
he has grasped it consists in his ability to do the right thing: to use ‘She’s in pain’, ‘I believe 
she’s in pain’, ‘I doubt whether she’s in pain’, and so on appropriately.  And that is all we can 
say.  We cannot explain how the practice becomes clear to the child: how he suddenly comes 
to master the language-game; how he moves from not understanding to understanding.  As 
Wittgenstein puts it in another context, ‘there is no how’ (see RPP I 428).  Of course there is 
in principle an account to be given of what went on in the child’s brain and nervous system 
when he acquired the new ability.  But, in Wittgenstein’s view, such an account cannot give 
us the sort of explanation we wanted when we asked how a practice can suddenly become 
clear. 
The remark from LW I 873 concerns a particular case.  But the view Wittgenstein 
expresses – that there is no informative answer to the question, how a practice suddenly 
becomes clear to someone – is quite general.  In particular, Wittgenstein does not suggest that 
we can explain someone’s suddenly grasping a practice by appealing to the fact that she 
suddenly saw things in a new way. 
That might seem puzzling.  For doesn’t Wittgenstein himself use the vocabulary of 
seeing in connection with concept-acquisition: specifically, in connection with grasping a 
rule?  In teaching someone a rule, he says, we start by explaining how the rule is to be 
applied.  If that explanation is not understood, we can switch to another, or supplement the 
first explanation with a second.  But at some point, we can give no further explanation.  And 
at that point, all we can say is ‘Don’t you see . . . .?’ (see e.g. PI §185, Z 302).  The person 
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who has grasped the rule sees how to go on: she sees what the rule requires at each successive 
step.  The person who does not grasp the rule, by contrast, does not see how to go on; she 
does not see the regularity or pattern involved in the correct applications of the rule.  But in 
that case, we might think, we surely can appeal to facts about how someone sees things in 
order to explain her grasp of a rule.  Why did Anne grasp the rule for developing the series 2, 
4, 6, 8 . . . while Bob did not?  Because she saw the pattern in the series while he did not; she 
saw 1000, 1002, 1004 . . . as the correct continuation of the series, while he did not.  So, at 
least, one might be tempted to think. 
In Wittgenstein’s view, however, the putative explanations are illusory.  The fact that 
Anne sees 1000, 1002, 1004 . . . as the correct continuation of the series is not something that 
explains her grasp of the rule for developing the series; it is part of what her grasp of the rule 
consists in.  Similarly, Bob’s failure to see the pattern in the series is not something else 
about him, distinct from the fact that he does not grasp the rule for developing the series.  On 
the contrary, his failure to see the successive steps of the series as the correct continuation of 
the series just is his failure to grasp the rule for developing the series; so we cannot use the 
former to explain the latter. 
What about the broader suggestion that seeing-as helps to explain creativity or 
innovation: that the conceptual or theoretical innovator’s achievement in devising her new 
concepts or theory can be explained in part by reference to the fact that she sees things in a 
new way?  The assessment of that suggestion depends on what the new way is in which the 
innovator sees things.  We can distinguish two kinds of case.  In cases of the first kind, seeing 
things in the new way is simply a matter of seeing them in terms of the new concepts or 
theory.  In cases of the second kind, the new way of seeing is independent of grasp of the new 
concepts or theory.  Seeing-as can help to explain innovation in the second kind of case, but 
not in the first. 
Suppose we accept that, in coming to grasp a new system of concepts or a new theory, 
one thereby comes to see things in a new way.  On this view, seeing things in the new way is 
seeing them in terms of the new concepts or theory.  But in that case, the fact that someone 
sees things in this new way cannot explain how she formed, or was able to form, her new 
concepts or theory; on the contrary, her seeing things in the new way presupposes her grasp 
of the new concepts or theory.  Conceptual or theoretical innovation may involve seeing 
things in a new way; but the innovator’s achievement is not explained by her seeing things 
that way. 
In the second kind of case, by contrast, one can see things in the new way without 
already grasping the new concepts or theory.  Suppose someone sees a new pattern in the 
phenomena; or she sees similarities between different cases that she had not previously 
noticed.  That prompts her to look for something that explains the pattern.  She devises her 
new theory to provide such an explanation.  In a case of that sort, the innovator’s new way of 
seeing things really can help to explain the formation of the new theory. What makes room 
for explanation is the fact that seeing the pattern was distinct from grasping the theory; after 
all, she saw the pattern before she formulated the theory.  For example, suppose an 
experimenter suddenly sees the pulses of electromagnetic radiation emanating from a 
particular point in the sky in a new way; she sees them as resembling the flashes of a 
lighthouse.  Seeing the pulses in that way suggests a particular theory about their source: the 
pulses, she hypothesizes, are produced by the rotation of a star that emits a constant beam of 
radiation, just as the flashes of a lighthouse are produced by the rotation of a lamp that emits 
a constant beam of light.  But the new way in which she saw the pulses – as resembling the 
flashes of a lighthouse – was distinct from the theory she subsequently devised to explain the 
phenomenon; she saw the pulses in that way before she devised the theory.  In that 
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circumstance, her seeing the pulses as she did really does help to explain her formulation of 
the new theory. 
We asked whether seeing-as can explain conceptual or theoretical innovation.  The 
discussion of this section has yielded the following points.  First, Wittgenstein himself does 
not appeal to seeing-as to explain the acquisition of new concepts or the mastery of new 
practices.  In his view, philosophy cannot explain how we make the transition involved in 
coming to master new concepts or practices.  Second, the idea that the innovator’s success in 
discovering new theories is explained by the fact that she sees things in new or unorthodox 
ways can be developed in two different ways.  In one version, the idea should be rejected: if 
the new way of seeing itself involves the new theory, it cannot explain the development of 
the theory.  In a different version, the idea contains an important truth: in cases where the 
new way of seeing is independent of the new theory, it may help to explain the development 
of the theory; but even in such cases – if Wittgenstein is right – there is bound to remain 
something basic or inexplicable in the innovator’s act of creation.   
 
 
4. Is seeing-as essential to understanding?  
In the previous sections we have been supposing, for the sake of argument, that when 
someone comes to grasp new concepts or a new theory she comes to see things in a new way.  
But is that supposition true?  Couldn’t someone grasp the new concepts or theory without any 
difference at all in the way she sees things?  After all, you grasp a word or concept if you use 
it in the right way: or at least, if you are a sufficiently fluent participant in the practice of 
using it.12  That is a matter of employing it appropriately, responding appropriately to its use 
by others, and so on.  If you do that, you grasp the word or concept.  The way you experience 
things seems irrelevant.  Saying that someone who grasps a new theory sees things in a new 
way may be a good metaphor.  But is there any reason to think that it is literally true? 
 Wittgenstein raises a closely related point.  He writes: 
The importance of [the concept of aspect-blindness] lies in the connection between 
the concepts of seeing an aspect and experiencing the meaning of a word.  For we 
want to ask, ‘What would someone be missing if he did not experience the meaning of 
a word?’ 
What would someone be missing, who, for example, did not understand the 
request to pronounce the word ‘till’ and to mean it as a verb – or someone who did not 
feel that a word lost its meaning for him and became a mere sound if it was repeated 
ten times over? (PPF §261) 
And similarly: 
When I supposed the case of a ‘meaning-blind’ man, this was because the experience 
of meaning seems to have no importance in the use of language.  And so because it 
looks as if the meaning-blind could not lose much (RPP I 202).13 
Wittgenstein’s comments focus on experiences of a particular kind, which he calls 
‘experiences of meaning’.  But the question he is asking can be generalized: if understanding 
a word is a matter of grasping its use, how can the way we experience things have any 
essential connection with whether or not we understand the word?  And why should grasping 
a new word or concept have any important connection with coming to experience things in a 
new way? 
One response to those questions is to accept that the talk of seeing in this context is 
simply a façon de parler; acquiring new concepts or theories does not literally involve a 
change in the way we see things. We find it natural to say that the person who grasps a new 
theory or system of concepts sees things in a new way.  But we could equally well, and more 
accurately, say that the person with a new theory or system of concepts conceives or 
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understands or describes things in a new way.  The natural association between grasping new 
concepts and seeing things in a new way is, on this view, an example of the general way in 
which our talk of thought, belief, and understanding is suffused with visual metaphors: ‘I 
don’t see what you mean’, ‘She saw the solution’, ‘He was blind to the implications’, and so 
on.  In each case, it is claimed, the phenomena in question are essentially cognitive, not 
experiential. 
How should we react to that suggestion?  One possibility is to concede the basic point 
– that there is no general connection between grasping new concepts and experiencing things 
in a new way – but to insist that in some cases the person who grasps new concepts really 
does thereby come to see things in a new way.  There is, as Wittgenstein points out, a 
difference between, on the one hand, merely knowing that something is an F, or interpreting 
it as an F, and, on the other hand, seeing it as an F.  And though in some cases the person 
who acquires new concepts merely comes to conceive or describe things in terms of the new 
concepts, in other cases she does more than that; in a perfectly literal, non-metaphorical 
sense, she comes to see things as falling under those concepts.  In short: if it is a mistake to 
say that acquiring new concepts always involves seeing things in a new way, it is equally 
mistaken to say that it never involves a new way of seeing.  That is an important corrective to 
the suggestion of the previous paragraph.  But does Wittgenstein’s treatment of seeing-as 
suggest any stronger response?   
I will explore two lines of thought that might be developed from Wittgenstein’s 
discussion.  The first line of thought adds modal force to the point just made: it is not just that 
a person who grasps a system of concepts may experience things in terms of those concepts; 
for every person, there must be some concepts for which that is true.  The second line of 
thought focuses on what it takes for someone to understand a concept and argues that we can 
distinguish different standards, or notions, of understanding.  By one standard, we can agree, 
someone who applies a set of concepts appropriately without seeing things in terms of those 
concepts counts as understanding the concepts in question; by another standard, however, she 
does not.  We can consider these two lines of thought in turn. 
Consider, first, the case of linguistic understanding.  It is a fundamental insight of 
Wittgenstein’s that there must be some cases in which one understands words or utterances 
immediately, without interpretation (see PI §201).  Understanding a word or an utterance can 
sometimes require an act of interpretation: as when I have to consult a dictionary in order to 
understand some word or phrase in Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales.  But it could not be the case 
that all understanding involved interpretation in that sense.  If I could not understand the 
dictionary’s definitions of Chaucer’s words without reference to a second dictionary, and I 
couldn’t understand the second dictionary’s definitions without reference to a third 
dictionary, and so on, then I could never understand Chaucer at all.  According to the first 
line of thought, a parallel argument shows that there must be some cases of seeing-as: cases 
in which one sees an object as falling under a given concept.  Identifying something as a 
such-and-such sometimes requires an act of interpretation: as when I work out that an 
unfamiliar object is a bottle-opener without seeing it that way.  I detect various properties of 
the object; I interpret the object as a bottle-opener on the basis of its possession of those other 
properties.  But it could not be the case that all concept application worked like that.  Suppose 
that the only way to identify an object as an F was to interpret it as an F on the basis of its 
being G, and the only way to identify the object as being G was to interpret it as being G on 
the basis of its being H, and so on.  Then we could never identify objects as falling under 
concepts at all.  So there must be some cases in which one simply sees an object as falling 
under a concept, rather than merely interpreting the object that way.14  To the best of my 
knowledge, Wittgenstein does not present that argument explicitly in his discussion of seeing 
and seeing-as.  But he does explicitly argue that seeing-as cannot be understood in terms of 
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interpretation (see PPF §§248-9).  And the argument just sketched is certainly suggested by 
Wittgenstein’s argument about linguistic understanding and interpretation.  Wittgenstein 
argues that there is a way of grasping a rule that is not an interpretation (PI §201).  Similarly, 
on the present argument, there is a way of identifying an object as falling under a concept that 
is not an interpretation: namely, seeing it as falling under the concept. 
The second line of thought focuses on the idea of understanding.  We began this 
section with a question: if understanding a concept is a matter of using it appropriately, how 
can the way someone experiences things be relevant to whether or not they understand?  One 
response to that question is to ask whether it is true that understanding a concept requires no 
more than using it appropriately.  At least: even if there is a legitimate sense in which one 
understands a concept provided only that one uses it appropriately, isn’t there a different 
sense in which understanding a concept requires, in addition, that one should experience 
things in a particular way?15 
We can start with a different case.  In Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology 
volume II, Wittgenstein raises the question, ‘Can a human being understand what “fearing” is 
without knowing fear?’ (RPP II 26).  ‘Knowing’ here is a translation of the verb kennen.  So 
what Wittgenstein is asking is whether someone can understand what ‘fearing’ is without 
being acquainted with fear: without having felt fear.  On one view, there is no reason at all 
why someone should have to have felt fear in order to understand the word ‘fear’.  All that is 
needed is the ability to use the word ‘fear’ appropriately: to apply it to cases in appropriate 
ways; to make appropriate connections with other words; and so on.  And one could perfectly 
well do that without ever having felt fear.  After all, doctors and psychiatrists can 
successfully identify sensations and emotions that they have never experienced themselves.  
They plainly have concepts of those sensations and emotions.  The same, it may be said, is 
true for the simple concept of fear. 
But it is possible to take a different view.  If someone has never felt fear, we could 
say, she does not really know what fear is; she does not fully understand people’s talk of fear.  
But why should we say that?  Wittgenstein approaches that question by considering what the 
person who has never felt fear is thereby unable to do: 
The question is: What kind of language-games can someone who is unacquainted with 
fear eo ipso not play?  (RPP II 27; see also Z 267) 
He highlights a deficiency in the person’s mastery of the ‘language-game’ of ascribing fear to 
others: 
One could say, for example, that he would watch a tragedy without understanding it.  
And that could be explained in this way: When I see someone else in a terrible 
situation, even when I myself have nothing to fear, I can shudder, shudder out of 
sympathy.  But someone who is unacquainted with fear wouldn’t do that.  We are 
afraid along with the other person, even when we have nothing to fear; and it is this 
which the former cannot do.  Just as I grimace when someone else is being hurt (RPP 
II 27). 
That suggests that the ability to relate someone else’s fear to feelings with which one is 
oneself familiar is an essential part of understanding what she is feeling as fear.  Someone 
who has never felt fear might learn to apply the word ‘afraid’ to others in circumstances 
where they are indeed feeling fear.  But she could not mean by ‘fear’ and ‘afraid’ what we 
mean by those words.  For the meaning of those words on our lips, the suggestion goes, 
depends in part on our sympathetic response to others’ fear: ‘we are afraid’ along with the 
other person.  And the person who is unacquainted with fear can have no such sympathetic 
response to others’ fear. 
 One response to this suggestion is that it fails to distinguish between understanding 
the word ‘fear’, on the one hand, and understanding the emotion of fear, or people who feel 
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fear, on the other.  Having felt fear, on this view, is not a necessary condition for 
understanding the word ‘fear’.  It may be a necessary condition for understanding the 
emotion, or the people who experience it.  But that has nothing to do with understanding the 
word.  Wittgenstein himself sometimes puts things in just that way.  Consider this case, for 
instance: 
It is . . . important as regards our considerations that one human being can be a 
complete enigma to another.  One learns this when one comes into a strange country 
with entirely strange traditions; and, what is more, even though one has mastered the 
country’s language.  One does not understand the people (PPF §325, first emphasis 
added). 
In Wittgenstein’s example, I understand the language of these people whose lives and 
traditions I do not share; I know what their words mean.  What I don’t understand are the 
people themselves: I cannot see the point or attraction of thinking and behaving as they do; I 
cannot make sense of them in the way that I can make sense of people whose values and 
traditions are closer to my own.16 
Wittgenstein seems, then, to offer us two different ways of thinking about the person 
who has never felt fear.  It is common ground that such a person lacks the kind of 
sympathetic response to others’ fear that we have: she does not understand what fear is like 
for the person who feels it.  But there are different ways of describing her situation.  On one 
view, she understands the word ‘fear’; but she doesn’t understand people’s experience of 
fear.  On a different view, she does not understand the word ‘fear’, precisely because she has 
no sympathetic understanding of those who are afraid.  It is natural to ask which of those 
views is correct. 
Wittgenstein’s position, however, is that there is no need to choose between these two 
positions.  There is, in his view, no hard-and-fast distinction between understanding words, 
on the one hand, and understanding people, on the other.  There are numerous different 
aspects, or strands, of understanding, and correspondingly many different standards of what it 
takes to understand a use of language.  Those different standards are equally legitimate. No 
one standard is more basic or theoretically significant than the others.  It is just part of the 
concept of understanding that it has these different aspects, or strands.  He writes: 
We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by 
another which says the same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by 
any other.  (Any more than one musical theme can be replaced by another.) 
In the one case, the thought in the sentence is what is common to different 
sentences; in the other, something that is expressed only by these words in these 
positions.  (Understanding a poem.) 
Then has ‘understanding’ two different meanings here? – I would rather say 
that these kinds of use of ‘understanding’ make up its meaning, make up my concept 
of understanding. 
For I want to apply the word ‘understanding’ to all this (PI §§531-2). 
Wittgenstein would say the same thing about the case we have been considering.  There is a 
use of ‘understand’ on which one can understand the word ‘fear’ without knowing what fear 
feels like. There is another use of ‘understand’ on which one cannot.  But that does not mean 
that the word ‘understand’ is ambiguous.  Rather, these different kinds of use of ‘understand’ 
make up its meaning.  
What does this discussion of the connection between understanding the word ‘fear’ 
and experiencing fear suggest about the connection between grasping concepts and seeing-
as?  What we have seen in the case of ‘fear’ is that there is a sense in which one only 
understands the word ‘fear’ if one has felt fear oneself.  Is there, similarly, a sense in which 
one only understands the concept F if one experiences things as F’s?  There is a range of 
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concepts, at least, for which it is very plausible that there is indeed such a sense of 
‘understand’.  That certainly seems true for a range of simple perceptible properties.  
Someone who is colour blind might learn to distinguish red things on the basis of their 
physical properties, without ever seeing them as red.  In one sense, she grasps the concept 
red.  In another, she does not.  (Alternatively: she grasps one concept of red; but she fails to 
grasp a different concept of red.)  The same is true for many aesthetic properties.  Someone 
might learn to distinguish minor chords from major ones on the basis of their structural 
characteristics, without ever hearing a chord as minor or being able to pick it out as minor on 
the basis of its sound.  She might learn to distinguish pairs of words that rhyme from pairs 
that do not without ever hearing two words as rhyming.  She might even learn to distinguish 
beautiful landscapes from dreary or ugly ones (even if only in a way that was parasitic on 
other people’s classifications), without a landscape ever looking beautiful to her.  There is a 
sense in which such a person grasps the concepts minor, or rhyming, or beautiful.  But there 
is also a sense in which she does not, or does not fully, grasp those concepts.  The same is 
true for a range of concepts that apply to social interactions.  Someone may have a theoretical 
understanding of what it is for a remark to be insulting or patronising, and he may be able to 
classify a wide range of remarks as insulting or patronising (or not), without ever 
experiencing a remark as insulting or patronising.  There is a sense in which he grasps the 
concepts insulting or patronising.  But there is a sense in which he does not; just as the 
person who is not acquainted with fear does not ‘shudder out of sympathy’ when she sees 
someone else in a terrible situation, so the person who has never experienced a remark as 
insulting does not feel a sense of sympathetic indignation or resentment when she sees 
someone else being insulted. 
However, this kind of link between grasping a concept and experiencing things as 
falling under it does not extend to every case.  Consider the concept cancerous.  Oncologists 
and pathologists can see a cell as cancerous; most lay people cannot.  But should we say that 
there is a sense of ‘understand’ in which understanding the concept cancerous requires the 
ability to see things as cancerous?  It is not clear that we should, because it is not clear why it 
matters that someone cannot see cells as cancerous, but must rather identify cancerous cells 
in some less immediate way; it is not clear what that person is ‘eo ipso unable to do’.  But, for 
present purposes, we need not determine the limits of the link between grasping a concept 
and experiencing things as falling under it.  It is sufficient to have shown that, for some 
concepts at least, there is a sense of ‘understanding’ in which understanding the concept 
requires the ability to experience things in terms of that concept.  That provides one answer to 
Wittgenstein’s question, why the way someone experiences things should matter for her 
understanding of words and concepts; in some cases, at least, seeing-as really is essential to 
understanding. 
We began the current section with a question: is it true that someone who comes to 
grasp a new theory or system of concepts thereby comes to see things in a new way?  If 
understanding a concept is a matter of using it appropriately, why should there be any 
essential connection between one’s grasp of concepts and the way one experiences the world?  
We have explored two responses to that question, developed from strands in Wittgenstein. 
The first response was that, for every thinker, there must be some concepts that figure directly 
in the content of her experience; it could not be true that applying concepts always required 
interpretation.  The second response distinguished different notions of understanding and 
argued that there is a sense of ‘understand’ in which more is required for understanding a 
concept than simply applying it appropriately; one must also enjoy appropriate experiences.   
Earlier in the paper, I quoted Wittgenstein saying that, when he gives his examples of 
seeing-as and aspect-perception, he is ‘not aiming at some kind of completeness’; nor is he 
aiming at ‘a classification of psychological concepts’; his examples ‘are only meant to enable 
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the reader to cope with conceptual unclarities’ (PPF §202).  The point of his discussion is not 
to advance a comprehensive or explanatory theory of seeing-as; it is to explore the 
phenomena in a way that will show by example how to achieve the kind of ‘overview’ or 
‘surveyable representation’ (PPF §122) that brings philosophical understanding.  In that 
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1  See Kuhn 1962, chapter 10. 
2  Margaret  Boden makes similar comments (though without the specific focus on seeing-as), 
distinguishing between historical creativity and psychological creativity and observing that 
psychological creativity is the philosophically more interesting phenomenon (see Boden 
2004, 2). 
3  There are important views of perception on which the character of a subject’s perceptual 
experience is completely independent of the concepts, if any, that she possesses.  On some 
views, the representational content of experience is entirely non-conceptual.  On other views, 
experience itself has no representational content at all (see e.g. Campbell 2002 ch. 6; Travis 
2004; Brewer 2011, ch. 5).  These views certainly require discussion.  For present purposes, 
however, I simply assume that seeing-as involves experiences with conceptual content – in 
order to focus on the special issues concerning novelty.  
4  For noticing an aspect, see PPF §113; for experiencing a change of aspects see e.g. PPF 
§§129, 130, 135, 152, 257; for the dawning or lighting up of an aspect, see e.g. PPF §§118, 
140, 207, 237, 247. 
5  See, for instance, Mulhall 2001, 255: ‘On my account, [experiences of aspect dawning] 
constitute only one striking manifestation of continuous aspect perception; and it is this 
concept – and the general attitude it characterizes – which is Wittgenstein’s real concern.’ 
6  See e.g. Glock 1996, 36 ff.; Johnston 1993, 243-4. 
7  For this case, see PPF §242. 
8  See for example PPF §§143-44 and 245.  For more on this point, see Child 2011, 185-7. 
9  I owe this point to Naomi Eilan, who discussed it in her presentation, ‘Aspect-Seeing and 
Thinking’, at the ‘Seeing-As and Novelty’ conference at York in 2012.   Eilan drew attention 
in particular to the developmental findings reported in Rock, Gopnik, and Hall 1994, Doherty 
and Wimmer 2005, and Wimmer and Doherty 2011. 
10  Stephen Mulhall takes the contrary view: ‘Someone who cannot, for example, see a 
schematic drawing of a cube first one way then another is someone who cannot continuously 
see the schematic drawing as a cube either way – she could not stand to such a picture of a 
three-dimensional object as she does to that object itself’ (Mulhall 2001, 254). 
11  The German has ‘erkennen’ which, like the English ‘recognize’, can be used in both a 
perceptual and a non-perceptual, merely cognitive way. 
12  For the ‘sufficiently fluent participant’ formulation, see Williamson 2007, ch. 4. 
13  See also Wittgenstein’s remark about a person who says that to him the words ‘if’ and 
‘but’ feel the same: ‘If he used the words “if” and “but” as we do, wouldn’t we think he 
understood them as we do?’ (PPF §40). 
14   The same caveat that was mentioned in note 3 above is needed here; a full defence of this 
argument would need to consider views of perception on which perceptual experience does 
not have conceptual content at all.  
15  An alternative way of developing essentially the same idea would set things up differently.  
On this alternative view, understanding a concept never requires more than using it 
appropriately; but using the concept appropriately may require that one experiences things in 
a particular way. 
16  Compare LW I 198: ‘He is incomprehensible to me means that I cannot relate to him as to 
others.’  Wittgenstein gives an example: ‘he gets angry, when we see no reason for it; what 
excites us leaves him unmoved. – Is the essential difference that we can’t foresee his 
reactions? – Couldn’t it be that after some experience we might know them, but still not be 
able to follow them?’ (LW I 192)   For related comments, see RPP II 568. 
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17  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the conference on Seeing-as and Novelty 
at York in 2012.  I am grateful to the participants in that conference, and especially to 
Michael Beaney, for their very helpful comments. 
